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DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY HELD IN JOINT TENANCY
WHEN ONE COTENANT CAUSES THE DEATH
OF THE OTHER
The most significant feature of property held by two persons' in
joint tenancy is that on the death of one joint tenant his interest in
the property ceases, leaving complete ownership in the survivor.
According to property doctrine the surviving tenant acquires no
new estate on the death of his cotenant, for an incident of joint
tenancy ownership is that each cotenant holds an undivided moiety
of the whole estate.2 When one joint tenant wrongfully kills his
cotenant, thus assuring his survivorship, the question raised is to
what extent, if any, the killing should affect the disposition of the
jointly held property.
When the representatives of murdered cotenants have attempted
to defeat the killer's right of survivorship on the theory that the
killer has inequitably gained by his unlawful act, they have been
met with the often effective argument that the killer has nsot gained
since he was possessed of the whole estate before the crime. In this
situation the equitable doctrine that no man should benefit from
his own wrong conflicts with the property concepts applicable to the
joint tenancy.
A similar problem is presented in the case of a tenancy by the
entirety. At common law a husband and wife were considered to
be one person, and thus the individual act of one tenant by the
entirety will not sever the tenancy.3 By contrast a conveyance by one
joint tenant constitutes a severance, and the grantee and the re-
maming joint tenant then hold as tenants in common.' Nevertheless,
since the distinguishing characteristics of undivided ownership and
survivorship exist in both of these types of ownership, both will
be considered in this Note as presenting the same problem.
Since a joint bank account with right.of survivorship is basically
similar to the two types of ownership discussed above,3 it also
will be considered in this Note. It should be noticed, however, that
1. Joint tenancy property can of course be held by more than two per-
sons. This Note, however, will deal only with the two owner situation, since
no further clarification of the problem under consideration would follow from
discussion of the multiple owner situation.
2. 4 Thompson, Real Property §§ 1775, 1778 (Perm. ed. 1940), 2
Tiffany, Real Property § 419 (3d ed. 1939).
3. 4 Thompson, Real Property § 1803 (Perin. ed. 1940).
4. Id. §§ 1778-80.
5. See Restatement, Restitution § 188, comment b (1937), Wide, Acqum-
sition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
Harv. L Rev. 715, 734 (1936).
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the rights of the owners of a joint bank account are created by
the contract of deposit which generally provides that either joint
owner may withdraw the entire sum deposited at any time."
Nearly all of the proposed or adopted solutions to the "killer-
survivor" problem have been based upon the property concepts of
right of survivorship and undivided ownership. This Note will
discuss and evaluate the variety of solutions which have been
adopted and will also discuss some of the more important problems
related to these solutions.
NON-STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Killer Keeps the Property
In the absence of a statute specifically stating that a killer may
not inherit from or take under the will of his victim, many courts
have held that the killer may not be prevented from taking his
victim's property by inheritance or devise.7 These courts have rea-
soned that it is the province of the legislature to declare public
policy and that the criminal codes exclusively define the punishment
for a felonious killing.
When the legislatures began to enact statutes preventing a killer
from inheriting from or taking under the will of his victim,' most
courts refused to apply these statutes to property held in joint
tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety on the ground that such an
interpretation would attribute to the legislature an intent that the
statutes be applied unconstitutionally This application, it is argued,
would be unconstitutional because of constitutional provisions which
prohibit forfeiture of estate.9 Since by property doctrine the killer's
interest is the same before and after survivorship, to take his estate
from him would work a forfeiture.10
Another argument expressed by many courts is based on the
same property doctrine that the survivor acquires no new interest
at the death of his cotenant. Although a statute may prohibit a killer
from acquiring property from his victim, if the joint tenancy doc-
6. Wade, supra note 5, at 734.
7 Crumley v. Hail, 202 Ga. 588, 43 S.E.2d 646 (1947), Hagan v. Cone,
21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S.E. 602 (1917), Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185
S.W 487 (1916) , Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888), Hallo-
way v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913).
8. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 525.87 (1953), Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-513
(1949).
9. E.g., Minn. Const. Art. I, § 11, Ill. Const. Art. II, § 11, Mo. Const.
Art. I, § 30. ,
10. E.g., Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939), Bed-
dingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W 108 (1906).
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trine of undivided ownership is strictly adhered to, such a statute
cannot affect the killer's right of survivorship since his interest be-
fore and after the crime is the same."
In the absence of a statute stating that a killer may not inherit
from or take under the will of his victim, it would seem that the
courts can adequately deal with the problem by applying the equit-
able maxim that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own
wrong.12 In the case of a joint tenancy the survivor takes no new
estate at the death of his cotenant, but he no longer must share
the profits or suffer the interference of Is cotenant; his heirs may
take the property after his death, or he may devise it.13 It seems,
therefore, that the killer in reality does acquire new rights which
can be withheld from him without causing a forfeiture of estate.2
Killer Is Deprived of the Whole Estate
5ome courts have felt that it would be unconscionable to penmit
a killer to take by descent or devise from his victim, even though
there is no statute to that effect. The courts of New York have
gone even further and held that a surviving joint tenant,10 tenant
by the entirety,1 7 or surviving owner of a joint bank account", is
deprived of all interest in the property because ie has killed his
cotenant; the representatives of the victim take the entire estate.
This view has not met with favor because it disregards the nature
of a joint tenancy.19 A better reason for disapproving of this view
is that it deprives the killer of all his interest including those rights
11. Weaker v. Landon, supra note 10; Wyckoff v. Clark, 77 Pa. D. & C.
249 (C.P 1951), Hamer v. Kinnan, 16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (C.P. 1931), Bed-
dingfield v. Estill & Newman, supra note 10.
12. Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945), Grose v.
Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W2d 464 (1948), Perry v. Strawbridge, 209
Mo. 621, 108 S.W 641 (1908).
13. See United State v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1939) ; Grose v.
Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 880-81, 211 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1948), Wenker v.
Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 272, 88 P.2d 971, 974 (1939).
14. Bradley v. Fox, 7 II. 2d 106, 1279 N.E.2d 699 (1955), Grose v.
Holland, supra note 13, In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885
(1952).
15. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W 641 (1908), Riggs
v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
16. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4ft
Dep't 1935).
17 Van Aistyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918).
18. In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Aisc. 668, 212 N.Y. Supp. 116 (Surr.
Ct 1925).
19. See Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 438-39, 195 N.E. 838, 841




which he held before the crime, it effects, in substance, a forfeiture
of estate.
Constructve Trust Imposed on the Killer
Perhaps the most popular modern view is that, in the absence
of a statute preventing it, the killer takes the property to which lie
would otherwise be entitled, and equity imposes a constructive trust
upon him for the benefit of the heirs of his victim.2 The amount of
the property subjected to the constructive trust varies with the
jurisdiction. The purpose of this approach is to preserve the basic
property concepts of undivided ownership and right of survivorship
and still give recognition to the equitable maxim that no one shall be
permitted to profit by his own wrong.2t It has been suggested that
the relative life expectancies of killer and victim should be deter-
mined by mortality tables, and if the tables determine that he would
have survived his victim, the killer should be allowed to keep
the entire property, except that half the income from the property
should be held in trust for the heirs of the victim during the esti-
mated life span of the victim ;22 if it should be determined that the
victim would have survived, this view would allow the heirs of the
victim to take the entire property but would reserve to the killer
half the income for his life. Another view, not based on mortality
tables, is that the killer holds half of the income in trust for the
heirs of his victim and keeps half the income for his own use, but
upon his death the entire property passes to the heirs of the victim,
under this view it is assumed that the victim would have survived
the killer, since the killer prevented a natural determination of who
would survive.
2
It has been said that the constructive trust theory allows the
killer to retain the bare legal title and hence does not violate the
constitutional provisions against forfeiture of estate.2 4 It seems,
20. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ch. 1951), Neiman
v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952), Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372,
137 S.E. 188 (1927) Accord, Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385(1952) , Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N.E.2d 716 (1952), Garner v.
Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948), Pritchett v. Henry, 287 S.W.2d
546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). See Ames, Lectures on Legal History 321-22(1913) , 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 478 (2d ed. 1946) , 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 1054d (5th ed. 1941), IV Scott, Trusts § 493 (2d ed.
1956) , Restatement, Restitution § 188 (1937) , Reppy, The Stayer's Bounty-
In New York, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 424, 429-31 (1945).
21. See 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 20.
22. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 At. 517 (Ch. 1933) See
3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 478 (2d ed. 1946).
23. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ch. 1951). See IV
Scott, Trusts § 493.2 (2d ed. 1956) , Restatement, Restitution § 188, comment
b (1937).
24. See IV Scott, Trusts § 492 (2d ed. 1956)
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however, that these provisions m the various state constitutions were
adopted for the substantial purpose of protecting the heirs of a
criminal 5 and should not be disposed of by the application of a
fiction. The preservation of property concepts should not be para-
mount to an equitable disposition of the property.
In Vesey v. Vesey, 26 the Minnesota Supreme Court approved the
constructive trust theory, stating as its reasons that it does not take
any vested legal rights from the killer and gives effect to the doctrine
that one should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong. The
court did not indicate what portion of the estate the killer would be
required to hold in trust in the case of a joint tenancy, since the
case involved a joint.bank account. The court distinguished a joint
tenancy from a joint bank account on the basis that a bank account
is created by the contract of deposit, and hence, contract law and
not property law controls. The contract provided that the funds
deposited became the joint property of the obligees, but that the
balance of the account upon the death of one obligee became the
sole property of the survivor. By the terms of this contract either
obligee had a right to withdraw the entire sum on deposit. The
court held that since the killer had prevented a natural determination
of who would first have withdrawn the fund, the doubt should be
resolved against the killer, and the killer was required to hold the
entire sum on a constructive trust for the benefit of the heirs of the
victim.
It is not clear what portion of the estate will be withheld from
the killer in the case of a joint tenancy where property law controls
rather than contract law. It does seem clear, however, that the
Minnesota Supreme Court will not deprive the killer of his vested
legal interests in the property, but recognizing that the killer has
benefiited by his crime, it will require him to hold some portion
of the estate in trust for his victim's heirs. It is quite possible that
the court will recognize that the heirs of the killer should not be de-
prived of all their present or prospective interest; if the court recog-
nizes this, it is probable that it will require the killer to hold half of
the entire estate in trust for the victim's heirs, and allow him to
keep half for himself.
The TenaCy Conhnues with the Victim's Heirs Takinzg His Place
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in fn re King's Estate2T ad-
vanced a theory which no other court has used. Under this theory the
25. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202 (1875).
26. 237 Mina. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952).
27 26r Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952).
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status of the victim as a joint tenant continues in his representatives
until the killer dies, whereupon the victim's heirs take the property as
surviving joint tenant. The killer is presumed to be the first to die,
since he has eliminated the possibility of a natural determination of the
survivor. In the King case the killer committed suicide and thus
it was unnecessary for the court to determine what rights the killer
would have received had he lived. If the theory of the King case
should be extended to cases where the killer does not commit suicide
but continues to live as a joint tenant to the property, it is not clear
from the court's opinion whether he would be allowed to sever and
convert the tenancy to a tenancy in common. It seems, however,
that the presumption raised by the court that the killer would (lie
first indicates that a severance would not be allowed. Hence, the
effect of the case is that the killer is entitled only to half the income
for his life and all the rest goes to the heirs of the victim.
The difficulty with this theory is that it ignores the fact that
the joint tenancy has in reality been terminated by the act of the
killer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court is primarily concerned with
upholding the familiar property concepts associated with a joint
tenancy, but it still wishes to prevent the killer from profiting by his
own wrong. The Wisconsin solution is an example of the mampu-
lations of property doctrine courts can and do perform to reach their
pre-desired results. More equitable results are foreclosed by the
court's concern with the killer's guilt. If the court should iegin with
the predilection to treat the heirs of both killer and victim equally,
property doctrine can be easily manipulated to yield half the
property to each group of claimants.
The Joint Tenancy Is Severed b1, the Killer's Crime and
Converted Into a Tenancy m Coninon
The unlawful killing of one joint tenant by the other terminates
the unities of time, title, interest, and possession. Though it is true
that these unities are also destroyed at the natural death of one
joint tenant, it can be argued that property law should not recognize
a right of survivorship not contemplated by the grantor or pur-
chasers of an estate in joint tenancy The termination of the tenancy
through the act of one tenant in killing the other is clearly not
within the contemplation of the parties, and for that reason the
property law should recognize no survivorship.
Yet the fact remains that the unities have been destroyed. Ac-
cording to property concepts destruction of the unities can give rise
[Vol. 41:639
NOTES
to tvo relationships only, survivorship with the entire property
going to the surviving tenant or severance with each tenant taking
only half the property. Since survivorship should not be permitted
to result from the killing of a cotenant, severance is the only doc-
trinal solution. A felomous killing, thus, can be viewed as just an-
other means by which a joint tenancy may be severed. In the case
of a tenancy by the entirety, the tenancy may be severed by divorce,
and so a felonious killing, which also terminates the marriage
status, should sever the tenancy too.28
The equal division of the property on the basis that the killing
has caused a severance has received substantial support in recent
years29 and appears to be the preferable solution. It will perhaps
not do complete justice in every case, but if a general rule is de-
sirable this would appear to be the most practical. It leaves the
pumishment of the killer to the criminal law and provides for both
the heirs of the victim and those of the killer. In the case where
a husband and wife own property in joint tenancy and both have
children by former marriages, the justice of the result under this
theory is evident.30
STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
The majority of the states have statutes dealing with the prob-
lem which arises when a person takes property by killing another,
but these statutes vary a great deal in their provisions.3 ' The most
common type of statute provides that one who feloniously causes
the death of another shall not take from his victim by testate or
intestate succession, or as life insurance beneficiary.32 These statutes
have generally been said to be inapplicable where one joint tenant
kills another. 3 They have often been narrowly construed because
they are said to be penal,34 and some have been circumvented on
28. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1951) , Ashwood v. Patterson,
49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951), Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W2d 494 (Ky. 1954),
Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1956), Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W2d 464 (1948), Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913,
27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
29. See Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E2d 699 (1955) and cases
cited at note 28 supra.
30. See Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954).
31. See IV Scott, Trusts § 492.1 (2d ed. 1956).
32. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 525.87 (1953), Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 59-513(1949). See notes 52-61 infra and related text.
33. E.g., In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952),
Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 545, 78 NAV2d 450, 455 (1956)(dictum).
34. E.g., Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 423, 218 P.2d 514. 517-18(1950), In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Ioxwa 449, 101 N.W 151 (1904).
-1957]
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questionable grounds.35 Sometimes the statutes are poorly drafted"
and given literal interpretation.37 Although most of these statutes
do not deal with jointly held property, it should be expected that
similar difficulties will be met with those that do.
Only a few states have statutes expressly dealing with the prob-
lem which arises when one joint owner assures his survivorship by
killing the other. Pennsylvania and South Dakota 8 have enacted
an elaborate statutory solution proposed by Professor Wade. 9 In
the case of a tenancy by the entirety, this solution would give one
half of the property to the victim's estate, and the killer would retain
one half for his life, at the killer's death, his half would pass to the
victim's estate also.4" In the case of a joint tenacy or joint bank ac-
count the result is the same, with the important exception that the
killer may obtain a division or severance of the property during his
lifetime.41 This distinction is made because according to property
doctrine a joint tenant or a joint obligee can compel a division of
the property by his individual act, while one tenant by the entirety
cannot.42 Wade admits that his solution is not designed to protect
the heirs of the killer, but he argues that after all they have no
claim except through the killer. 41
Although it is true that the heirs of the killer have no claim to
property except through the killer, Wade's argument fails to explain
why the killer's innocent heirs should be deprived of the possibility
of succeeding to the property The fact that a property interest has
passed through a felon does not seem to constitute an argument for
depriving the ultimate heirs of their expectant interest in the prop-
35. Where Kansas and Oklahoma had similar statutes to the effect that
one convicted of taking another's life may not inherit from his victim, a federal
court held that one convicted of third degree manslaughter (killing in the heat
of passion with no design to effect death) in Kansas could not be precluded
from inheriting Oklahoma property because the Kansas conviction had no
extraterritorial effect. Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir.),
appeal dismzssed, 255 U.S. 562 (1920).
36. Where a statute prevented one from taking an estate which lie killed
to obtain, it was held that one was not prevented from taking when there
was no evidence that the killing was committed for the purpose of taking the
victim's property. Ward v. Ward, 174 Va. 331, 6 S.E.2d 664 (1940). This
statute has since been modified. See infra note 50.
37 A statute which said that one finally adjudged guilty of murder may
not inherit from his victim, was held to be inapplicable when the killer com-
mitted suicide immediately after killing his victim. Shuman v. Schick, 95
Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330 (1953).
38. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 20, §§ 3445, 3446 (Purdon Supp. 1956), S.Dak
Code § 56.0505 (1939).
39. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-Al
Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936)
40. Id. at 728.
41. Id. at 732.
42. Id. at 733.
43. Id. at 730.
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erty. Indeed, the policy behind anti-forfeiture clauses in our con-
stitutions is based on the idea that it is unjust to deprive the heirs
of a felon of their expectancy.44
In a Pennsylvania case it was held that a statute adopting this
solution did not apply where the property had been acquired before
the enactment of the statute.45 The killing had occurred after the
statute was enacted, but the court held that the statute was not retro-
active in application and therefore did not affect the disposition of
an estate by the entirety acquired before the statute was in force. It
was unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute, but
the court indicated that there might be a question as to whether it
violated the constitutional provision against forfeiture of estate.40
Kentucky has a statute which provides that a joint tenant who
has been convicted for feloniously killing his cotenant forfeits "all
interest in and to the property of the decedent, including any interest
he would receive as surviving joint tenant", the property forfeited
goes to the victim's estate. The Kentucky court's solution to an
analogous problem indicates that it will probably interpret the
statute's ambiguous language as demanding a half and half division
of jointly held property.48
South Carolina has a statute which provides that a killer may
not inherit from his victim, but if the killer has children who would
inherit from the victim if the killer were dead, the children shall
take whatever interest their parent would have taken.4 This statute
is, of course, inapplicable in the case of a joint tenancy, but it ilus-
trates the idea that the heirs of a killer should be provided for and
not punished.
The most desirable statutory solution would be one which pro-
vides that the heirs of the victim take one half of the property and
the killer takes the other half. This, in effect, makes the act of
killing the means by which the joint tenancy is severed.
44. See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202 (1875), Note, 44 Yale
L. J. 164 (1934).
45. Wyckoff v. Clark, 77 Pa. D. & C. 249 (C.P. 1951).
46. Wyckoff v. Clark, supra note 45 at 257 (dictum).
47. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381280 (Baldwin 1955).
48. Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954) involved the dis-
position of a tenancy by the entirety where the husband killed his wife and
then himself. The Kentucky statute did not apply, since conviction of the hus-
band was impossible. The court distributed half the property to the heirs of
the wife and half to the heirs of the husband. In deciding the case the court
surveyed the non-statutory solutions of other jurisdictions and settled on its
decision as the most logical and just. It seems then that.m construing the
ambiguous statute, should occasion arise, the court will abide by its prior
determination of justice and logic.
49. S.C. Code § 19-5 (1952).
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REQUIREMENTS OF AN INTENT To KILL
If the fundamental principle running through these cases is that
one shall not profit from his wrong, a problem in defining "wrong"
is presented. It appears to be well settled law that in order to
prevent a killer from taking an interest in property as a result of
the victim's death, it is unnecessary that the killing be committed
with the motive of obtaining such an interest?0 It follows that in
preventing profit through wrong, the courts will go beyond frus-
tration of unconscionable plans. It also appears clear that a person
whose negligent but non-criminal act causes the death of another
will not be barred from acquiring the victim's property as the re-
sult of his death, as applied to the joint tenancy situation, death
resulting from an unintentional tort is so nearly like a natural
determination of survivorship that it may fairly be supposed to
have been within the comtemplation of the parties who created the
joint tenancy 5 It thus appears that the question is not merely
whether a legal wrong was committed, but whether the legal wrong
is wrong enough. The answer to such a question must necessarily
be based on emotional reaction.
Statutes which deal with the problem of defining "wrong" are
varied in their terms.12 Sometimes only murder will prevent the
killer from taking property,5 3 while other statutes require murder
50. See IV Scott, Trusts § 492.3 (2d ed. 1956). Gollnik v. Mengel, 112
Minn. 349, 128 N.W 292 (1910), involving the statutory inheritance rights
of a widow who murdered her husband, implies the contrary but the case
is now superseded by Minn. Stat. § 525.87 (1953) Since similar considera-
tions are involved, authorities cited in this section deal with the killer's right,;
to life insurance proceeds and to testate and intestate succession as well as
rights as surviving cotenant.
51. In Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 5, 3 N.E.2d 17
18-19 (1936), the court reasoned that if the maxim that no one should be
permitted to profit by his own wrong were applied literally, then the
slightest negligence would be a bar; this would be impractical and unjust.
In Schreiner v. High Court of I.C.O. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576, 580 (1890), the
court said that no homicide which is the result of carelessness or wluch
is unintentional should bar the beneficiary's right to the proceeds of a life
insurance policy, since a contract of insurance impliedly assumes the risk of
all careless acts.
Of course when the contest is over life insurance, the insurer cannot
escape liability even if the killer-beneficiary is prevented from taking the
proceeds. When the beneficiary cannot take the life insurance fund, the estate
of the deceased will. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala. 493, 17 So.2d
761 (1944) , West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal. App. 2d 771, 138
P.2d 384 (1943). In three situations, however, the insurer will be relieved of
liability if the beneficiary has slain the insured (1) when murder of the
insured is an excepted risk; (2) when the insurance contract is fraudulently
made; (3) when only the beneficiary has an interest in the policy. IV Scott.
Trusts § 494.2 (2d ed. 1956).
52. Statutes are collected in IV Scott, Trusts § 492.1 n.1 (2d ed. 1956)




or .manslaughter,"4 murder or voluntary manslaughter,5 felonious
killing, 56 or intentional, 7 willfuls or unlawful 9 causation of death.
These statutes also vary m the requirement of a conviction," and
the nature of the succession to property from which the killer is
barred."'
Cases decided in the absence of statute are also inconsistent as
to the degree of wrong required to bar the killer. There is sparse
authority for limiting the the definition of "wrong" to murder.0 "
The great majority of cases require an intentional criminal homi-
cide.63 Thus because an insane killer is mcapable of forming the
requisite intent, he will not be prevented from succeeding to his vic-
tin's property. 4 A few jurisdictions hold that one who commits any
criminal homicide cannot take from ins victim. 5 New York has
held that first0 6 or second degree manslaughter, 7 both defined as
homicide without a design to effect death, is sufficient to bar the
54. D.C. Code Ann. 18-109 (1951).
55. Cal. Prob. Code 8 258 (West 1956), S.C. Code § 19-5 (1952).
56. E.g., Minn. Stat § 525.87 (1953), Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 59-513(1949).
57 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 6-212 (Burns 1953).
58. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 479, 672 (1942).
59. E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat §§ 30-119, 30-120 (1943), Pa. Stat. tit. 20,§§ 3441-3456 (Purdon 1956). See Okla. Stat. tit. 84, § 231 (1951) (convic-
tion of causing death), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 31-109, 31-207 (1955) (killing
other than accidental or m self defense).
60. See p. 652 infra.
61. See note 32 supra and related text; note 50 .mipra.
62. See Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N.W. 292 (1910), which is
superseded by Minn. Stat. § 525.87 (1953) , Restatement, Restitution, §§ 187,
189 (1937). A number of cases hold that one guilty of manslaughter is not
prevented from taking property through his victim's death. These cases,
however, deal with involuntary manslaughter, not voluntary manslaughter.
See discussion and cases cited in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39
F Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
63. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, sispra note 62.
64. Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956),
Eisenhardt v. Siegal, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938), In re Eckliardts
Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
The killer may be excused from standing trial in a criminal proceeding
by reason of insanity, but this fact does not prevent a court, in a civil pro-
ceeding held to determine the disposition of the property, from determining
whether the killer was insane at the time of the killing. Anderson v. Grasberg,
supra; Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
It has been held that the minority of the killer is not ground for ex-
eluding him from the rule that one may not profit by his wrong. In re
Sengillo's Estate, 206 Misc. 751, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 800 (1954).
65. It re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct.
1939), In The Estate of Hall, [1914] P 1 (C.A.), Lundy v. Lundy, 24
Can. Sup. Ct. 650 (1895).
66. "In re Sparks' Estate, supra note 65.
67 In re Drewes' Estate, 206 Misc. 940, 136 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Surr. Ct.
1954). But see 2 App. Div. 2d 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d 632 (4th Dep't 1956) in
which a related case was remanded for a factual determination of the manner
in which decedent met death.
68. N.Y. Pen. Law 88 1050, 1052.
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killer from taking the property In the leading New York case of
In re Sparks' Estate69 the court directed its attention not to the
question whether the killer intended to kill his victim, but to the
problem of whether manslaughter is sufficient wrong to bar the
killer from succeeding to his victim's property In deciding in the
affirmative, the court quoted from Van Alystyne v. Tuffy:
[W]here the natural and direct consequence of a criminal
act is to vest property in the criminal, whether he be a thief
or a murderer, the thought of his being allowed to enjoy it is
too abhorrent for the courts of this state, or of the United
States, to countenance, and this whether the crime was com-
mitted for that very purpose or with some other felonious de-
sign.7 0
And from the opinion of Hamilton, L. J., in Estate of Hall.
The distinction [between murder and manslaughter] seems
to me either to rely unduly upon legal classification, or else to
encourage what, I am sure would be very noxious - a senti-
mental speculation as to the motives and degree of moral guilt
of a person who has been justly convicted and sent to prison.7
Thus the language of the Sparks' case could support the rule
that any criminal homicide regardless of intent or motive is suffi-
cient to bar the killer from taking property as a result of his vic-
tim's death. However, while not clearly stated in the opinion it
appears that the killer feloniously assaulted his victim,72 although
he did not intend to kill, this plus the reference to "felonious
design" in the above quoted portion of the Van Alstyne case could
limit the Sparks' case at least to homicides resulting from an inten-
tional felonious act, and perhaps to homicides resulting from an
intentional felonious act directed toward the actual victim.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDaznd7" a federal court was
faced with the problem of whether manslaughter was a sufficient
wrong to prevent the killer from benefiting under an insurance
policy on the victim's life. This court held that manslaughter was
69. 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
70. 103 Misc. 455, 457, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 175 (Sup. Ct. 1918) This case
considered only whether the killing was required to be for the purpose of
obtaining the victim's property and is thus removed from context in the
Sparks' case.
71. [1914] P 1, 7-8 (C.A.)
72. It was alleged and not contested that the deceased was the victim of
the killer's "felonious violence." See also 40 Colum. L. Rev. 333 n. 39 (1940).
73. 39 F Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1941). See also United States v.
Kwasmewski, 91 F Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 415(1951).
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sufficient, but only if the killer intended to kill the victim. The
court criticized the Restatement of Restitution for laying down
a fiat rule that murder was a sufficient wrong and manslaugh-
ter was not. The court indicated that it would reach an opposite
result in the case of "statutory" manslaughter such as homicide
resulting from reckless operation of an automobile, attempted abor-
tion, setting a spring trap or gun, or careless use of firearms. The
court also stated by way of dictum that a killer convicted of murder
under the felony-murder rule should not be prevented from taking
property because of the victim's death since there was no intent to
kill the actual victim even though there may have been intent to
kill someone else.7 4 Tus court does not expressly deal with the
situation where the killer intended to inflict harm on his victim
but not to kill him, although the literal language suggests that the
killer could take under these circumstances.
The most rational solution would appear to lie between the
Sparks' and McDavid cases. Where there is an intent to kill the
actual victim, there should be no distinction between murder and
manslaughter; niceties such as the existence of "the heat of passion"
and a "coiling off period" may be appropriate to questions of life
and liberty, but seem inappropriate to determination of property
rights. For similar reasons, it seems inappropriate to distinguish
between an intentional infliction upon the victim of harm that was
not intended to prove fatal, and an intent to kill. Where the homicide
results from reckless or dangerous conduct that was not intended
to cause either harm r death, the killer should not be deprived
of property rights even though the homicide is punishable as a
crime. Here the "wrong"'more closely resembles simple negligence
-a natural termination of life-than does an intentional infliction
of harm. In the felony-murder situation, where death of the victim
although not intended, results from an attempt to kill another or
even an attempt to commit a felony other than murder, the killer
should be barred. The judicial conscience should be shocked no
less by the thought of a killer enjoying property as a result of a chain
of fortuitous but still fatal circumstances set in motion by the killer's
intentional felonious act than by the thought of one enjoying prop-
erty as the direct result of an intent to kill his victim.
74. See also Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 576 (1955),
where it was held that one who kills his wife while firing his revolver at
another does not lose his right to inherit from her; in order to deprive the
killer of Ins right of inheritance it must be shown that Is intent was to kill




REQUIREMENT OF A CONVICTION
Some state statutes preclude a killer from taking property from
his victim only if he is convicted of a criminal homicide. 75 Where the
killer commits suicide before conviction, these statutes do not pre-
vent him from taking his victim's property 70 A requirement of
conviction, however, seems unwise, since suicides appear to be quite
common in these cases. 7 7
The state must prove the killer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
to obtain a conviction in a criminal proceeding. 8 In a civil pro-
ceeding to determine the right of the killer to take the property, the
guilt of the killer need only be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.79 Therefore, if the killer is not found guilty in a criminal
proceeding, it is still possible to find him guilty on the same evi-
dence in a civil proceeding. 0
The requirement of a conviction is tantamount to requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil proceeding. The neces-
sity for a high degree of proof in criminal cases is based on the
policy that the severe consequences of punishment should not be
imposed unless the tribunal is highly certain of the defendant's
guilt.8' Transferring the strict requirement of proof from the
criminal to the civil trial is undesirable, since only a determination
of property rights between two private claimants is at stake in the
civil case.
Where a conviction for criminal homicide is a statutory requisite
in a civil proceeding to prevent the killer from taking the property,
the conviction is, of course, admissible in evidence and is conclusive
of the killer's guilt.8 2 Where a conviction is not required, however,
the verdict in a criminal proceeding is not conclusive of guilt or
innocence.8 3 It has even been held that the verdict in the criminal
proceeding is not admissible in the civil proceeding. 4 It would
75. See IV Scott, Trusts § 492.1 (2d ed. 1956).
76. Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021 (1926).
77 See e.g., Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021 (1926),
Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954), Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103
Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918), Halloway v. McCormick
41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913), In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52
N.W.2d 885 (1952).
78. McCormick, Evidence § 321 (1954).
79. Id. § 319.
80. IV Scott, Trusts § 492.4 (2d ed. 1956).
81. McCormick, Evidence § 321 (1954)
82. IV Scott, Trusts § 492.4 (2d ed. 1956).
83. United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950),
35 Minn. L. Rev. 415 (1951) (acquittal not conclusive) , Sovereign Camp
W.O.W v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933) (conviction not conclusive).
84. Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1956) (verdict of acquital
inadmissible) , Lillie v. Modern Woodmen of America, 89 Neb. 1, 130 N.W
1004 (1911) (verdict of conviction inadmissible)
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appear that where the criminal proceeding resulted in a conviction,
even though it is not a requisite of a civil action to prevent the killer
from taking property, the verdict should be admissible in evidence
and conclusive of the killer's guilt. If an issue of fact has been de-
cided in a criminal proceeding with more extensive procedural safe-
guards and a greater burden of proof to overcome, retrying the
same issue in a civil proceeding seems unsound judicial administra-
tion. Conversely, it is clear that a verdict of acquittal in the criminal
proceeding, since the acquittal proves only that the lugher burden
of proof was not met by the prosecution. It seems sound to refuse
to receive the verdict of acquittal in evidence on the ground that the
jury will fail to understand the difference in burden of proof be-
tween civil and criminal proceedings to the prejudice of the alleged
victin's estate. Any argument that the result of the criminal pro-
ceeding should yield mutual benefits and burdens to the parties in
the civil action, with reference to presumptions and the exclusionary
rules of evidence, would seem to be based upon emotional reaction
rather than upon sound analysis of the principles of evidence.
CONCLUSION
The treatment which the courts have given to the problem of a
joint tenancy destroyed by an unlawful killing has been rather narrow
and unrealistic. The approach which has generally been taken has
been to patch up the shattered joint tenancy as well as possible and
to attempt to restore the tenancy to the state it was in before the
killing. At one extreme is the position that the fact of survivorship
is controlling and the killer must be permitted to keep the interest
he acquired by killing his cotenant8 5 At the other extreme is the
view that the killer may not profit by his wrongful act and that it
will be presumed that the victim would have survived if he had not
been killed.8 6 It appears evident that no amount of judicial mending
will put the joint tenancy back together again, and this should be
recognized.
Two policies-must be compromised to reach a fair solution of the
problem. The manifest unfairness of permitting the killer to take the
entire property by right of accelerated surivorship demands that
some interest be given to the victirm's estate. The policy that one
should not benefit by doing wrong can remedy the unfairness by
ta~ong the killer's ill gotten gains. Yet the substance of the con-
stitutional provisions against forfeiture of estate requires that the
85. Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P2d 971 (1939).
86. Nemian v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952).
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heirs of a wrongdoer should not suffer for their ancestor's crime,
and therefore some interest must be preserved to the killer. To take
what is gained does not conflict with the proposition that punish-
ment should be left to the criminal law, but to take the whole prop-
erty would resemble punishment in a civil case. By use of the
doctrine of severance the compromise can be made so that each
group of claimants receives half the property Thus the killer is
prevented from profiting by his survivorship, and yet lie is per-
mitted to keep what he clearly had power to vest in himself before
the act; the victim's estate receives its wergild, and yet the anti-
forfeiture policies are satisfied by provision for the innocent heirs of
the killer. This is achieved through a reasonable manipulation of
property doctrine.
